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PUTTING THE RABBIT BACK IN THE HAT: 
NOEL CANNING’S IMPACT ON EIGHTEEN 
MONTHS OF NLRB DECISIONS AND FUTURE 
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 
Paul Kind∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Noel Canning1 interpreted the 
Recess Appointments Clause (alternatively, “Clause”)2 for the first 
time in history.3 In so doing, the Court invalidated hundreds of 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the “Board”) decisions 
from 2012 and 2013 and set the standard for future presidential 
appointments of officials. This Comment focuses on the impact of 
Noel Canning on (1) the invalidated NLRB decisions and (2) future 
presidential nominations.  
The Noel Canning opinion centered around whether President 
Obama had constitutionally applied the Recess Appointments Clause 
in appointing three of five NLRB members in January 2012. The 
Court ultimately held that the members had been unconstitutionally 
appointed because the recess had not been long enough to trigger the 
Clause.4  
The controversy at issue stemmed from a somewhat routine 
dispute between an employer and a union. The dispute resulted in a 
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. Religion &
Philosophy, Indiana Wesleyan University, 2004. I would like to thank the editors and staff of the 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their fine work. I am also extremely grateful to Professors 
Aimee Dudovitz and Georgene Vairo for their academic guidance and personal encouragement 
throughout my years in law school. Finally, deep gratitude goes to my wife, Brooke. A single 
sentence could not convey my appreciation for her support, inspiration, and faithfulness. 
1. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
2. The Recess Appointments Clause states that “[t]he President shall have Power to fill up
all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which 
shall expire at the End of their next Session.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 cl. 3. 
3. The Court stated, “We have not previously interpreted the [Recess Appointments]
Clause . . . .” Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560. 
4. See id. at 2557.
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decision by the NLRB in favor of the union.5 The employer then 
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, arguing that the NLRB decision should be thrown out 
because three of the five members had been unconstitutionally 
appointed. The Court of Appeals agreed with the employer and 
invalidated the NLRB decision.6 
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Court of Appeals 
decision holding that the appointments had been unconstitutional. 
However, the Court was sharply divided between a five-Justice 
majority, authored by Justice Breyer, and a four-Justice concurrence, 
vehemently authored by Justice Scalia.7 The two opinions disagree 
on everything except the final judgment. Further, the majority 
opinion overturned the rationale of the Court of Appeals decision in 
its entirety and upheld only the end result. 
This Comment unpacks the Noel Canning opinion’s reasoning 
before delving into the opinion’s impact on the invalidated NLRB 
decisions and future presidential appointments. Part II lays out the 
facts discussed in the opinion. Part III takes an in-depth look at the 
Court’s reasoning. Finally, Part IV analyzes the impact of Noel 
Canning on the invalidated NLRB decisions and future presidential 
appointments. 
II. NOEL CANNING: THE FACTS
On September 26, 2011, an NLRB administrative law judge 
(ALJ) ruled in favor of Teamsters Local 760 (“the Union”) and 
against Noel Canning, a bottler and distributor of PepsiCola products 
and a division of the Noel Corporation.8 Specifically, the ALJ held 
that Noel Canning had violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National 
Labor Relations Act by refusing to execute and enter into a collective 
5. See Noel Canning, A Div. of the Noel Corp. & Teamsters Local 760, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 4
(Feb. 8, 2012). 
6. See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct.
2861 (2013), and aff’d but criticized, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
7. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Court’s decision
transforms the recess-appointment power from a tool carefully designed to fill a narrow and 
specific need into a weapon to be wielded by future Presidents against future Senates. To reach 
that result, the majority casts aside the plain, original meaning of the constitutional text in 
deference to late-arising historical practices that are ambiguous at best. The majority’s insistence 
on deferring to the Executive’s untenably broad interpretation of the power is in clear conflict 
with our precedent and forebodes a diminution of this Court’s role in controversies involving the 
separation of powers and the structure of government. I concur in the judgment only.”). 
8. Noel Canning, 358 N.L.R.B. No. 4 at *1.
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bargaining agreement that had been verbally agreed to by the parties 
during negotiations.9 Noel Canning appealed the decision, and on 
February 8, 2012, the NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision.10 As a 
result, the NLRB “ordered the distributor to execute the agreement 
and to make employees whole for any losses.”11 
Subsequently, Noel Canning appealed the NLRB’s decision to 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.12 Noel 
Canning argued that the NLRB’s decision should be set aside 
because three of the five Board members had been invalidly 
appointed.13 
On January 4, 2012, the President appointed three NLRB 
members—Sharon Block, Richard Griffin, and Terence Flynn—by 
invoking the Recess Appointments Clause, thus bypassing a Senate 
vote.14 At that time, the Senate had taken a series of brief recesses 
from December 17, 2011, until January 23, 2012.15 According to a 
Senate resolution, the Senate held pro forma sessions every Tuesday 
and Friday during this period.16 Noel Canning argued that the Recess 
Appointments Clause did not support appointments that were made 
while the Senate was in a three-day adjournment that occurred 
between pro forma sessions on January 3 and 6, 2012.17 
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Noel Canning but not for 
the reason that Noel Canning had argued.18 The Court of Appeals 
held that the appointments had been unconstitutional because they 
had been made during an intra-session recess (a recess within a 
formal session of Congress) rather than an inter-session recess (a 
recess between formal sessions of Congress).19 Because the second 
session of the 112th Congress had begun one day before the 
9. Id. at *3, *8.
10. Id. at *1.
11. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. Pro forma sessions are often only seconds-long and have been used by the Senate to
stifle a President’s ability to make recess appointments by breaking a longer recess into several 
shorter adjournments. See Alexander M. Wolf, Taking Back What’s Theirs: The Recess 
Appointments Clause, Pro Forma Sessions, and A Political Tug-of-War, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2055, 2059, 2067 (2013). 
17. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2557–58.
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appointments, the appointments occurred during an intra-session 
recess and not an inter-session recess.20 Furthermore, the Court of 
Appeals stated that the appointments were unconstitutional because 
the Recess Appointments Clause applies only to vacancies that arise 
during the recess.21 In this instance, the vacancies had occurred well 
before the recess.22 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals deemed the 
NLRB’s decision to be invalid because the NLRB had not had a 
properly appointed quorum of members.23  
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted the Solicitor General’s 
petition for certiorari on behalf of the government.24 
III. NOEL CANNING: THE COURT’S REASONING
The Supreme Court addressed three issues in determining the 
constitutionality of the President’s appointments: (1) whether the 
phrase “recess of the Senate” refers only to an inter-session recess, or 
also includes an intra-session recess; (2) whether the phrase 
“vacancies that may happen” refers only to vacancies that first come 
into existence during a recess, or also includes vacancies that arise 
prior to a recess but exist during the recess; and (3) whether pro 
forma sessions should be ignored in calculating the recess’s length.25 
A. Does the Recess Appointments Clause
Apply to Both Inter- and Intra-Session Recesses? 
First, on the issue of whether the Recess Appointments Clause 
includes both inter- and intra-session recesses, the Court disagreed 
with the Court of Appeals and held that the Clause does apply to 
both types of recesses.26 The Court of Appeals’ narrow interpretation 
of the Clause limited recess appointments to the inter-session recess, 
the annual recess between formal sessions of Congress.27 Contrary to 
the Court of Appeals,28 the Supreme Court determined that the 
Clause also applies to intra-session recesses of sufficient length.29 
20. Id. at 2558.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 2556–57.
26. Id. at 2567.
27. Id. at 2557–58.
28. Id. at 2557, 2561.
29. Id. at 2561.
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The Court determined this by first looking to the Constitution’s 
text.30 After surveying founding-era dictionaries and remarks by the 
Founders, the Court found that the word “recess” applies to either 
type of recess.31 Further, the word “the”—which precedes “recess” in 
the Clause—may refer to either a particular recess (e.g., the 
inter-session recess) or recesses generally and universally.32 Thus, 
the Court found that the Constitution’s text is ambiguous as to this 
question.33 
Next, the Court looked to the Clause’s purpose: giving “the 
President authority to make appointments during ‘the recess of the 
Senate’ so that the President can ensure the continued functioning of 
the Federal Government when the Senate is away.”34 Because the 
Senate is away during both an inter-session recess and an 
intra-session recess, the Court held that the Clause should apply to 
both.35 
Finally, the Court looked to historical precedent,36 noting both 
that intra-session recesses have been longer and more frequent since 
192937 and that Presidents have consistently interpreted the word 
“recess” to apply to both inter- and intra-session recesses.38 
Accordingly, the Court stated that “three-quarters of a century of 
settled practice is long enough to entitle a practice to ‘great weight in 
a proper interpretation’ of the constitutional provision.”39 In addition, 
the Court noted that the Senate has not called into question the 
broader understanding of “recess,” despite Presidents making 
“countless recess appointments during intra-session recesses.”40 
The Court again turned to historical practice to determine the 
length of an intra-session recess that would trigger the Recess 
Appointments Clause.41 To begin with, all parties concerned agreed 
that a recess must be at least three days in length for the Recess 
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2562.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2564.
39. Id. (citing Okanogan v. United States, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2566.
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Appointments Clause to apply.42 This conclusion stemmed from the 
Constitution’s Adjournments Clause, which provides: “Neither 
House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of 
the other, adjourn for more than three days.”43 Accordingly, a Senate 
recess that does not require the House of Representatives’ consent is 
not long enough to make the Recess Appointments Clause 
applicable.44 However, the Court found no record of there ever 
having been an intra-session recess appointment when the recess was 
shorter than ten days.45 The weight of historical practice pushed the 
Court to conclude “that a recess of more than three days but less than 
ten days is presumptively too short to fall within the Clause.”46 
In sum, the Recess Appointments Clause applies to both types of 
recesses, so long as the recess is at least ten days in length.47 
B. Is the Recess Appointments Clause Limited to
Vacancies That Come Open During the Recess?
Once again, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of 
Appeals, holding that the Recess Appointments Clause applies to 
recesses that come open before or during the recess.48 The Court 
again looked to the Constitutional text, the Clause’s purpose, and 
historical practice in making this determination. 
First, the Court found that the Clause’s text is ambiguous.49 A 
narrower reading would be to hold that “vacancies that may happen” 
must be interpreted as vacancies that originate during the Senate 
recess.50 The Court found such a narrow reading to be implausible, 
especially considering both Thomas Jefferson and William Wirt, 
President James Monroe’s Attorney General, discussed two possible 
constructions of the Clause.51 
42. Id.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4.
44. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2566.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2567 (“We add the word ‘presumptively’ to leave open the possibility that some
very unusual circumstance—a national catastrophe, for instance, that renders the Senate 
unavailable but calls for an urgent response—could demand the exercise of the recess-
appointment power during a shorter break.”). 
47. Exceptions may apply as mentioned in note 46, supra.
48. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2567.
49. Id. at 2568.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2567–68.
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Second, the Court stated that the Clause’s purpose—allowing 
the President to appoint officers when the Senate is not available to 
confirm them—favored applying the Clause to vacancies that had 
arisen before the recess.52 The Court determined that the Recess 
Appointments Clause’s purpose was to foster the government’s 
ongoing operation, and a narrow reading of the Clause would 
impinge on that purpose.53 Specifically, a narrow reading would keep 
the President from appointing an officer in certain circumstances “no 
matter who the official, no matter how dire the need, no matter how 
uncontroversial the appointment, and no matter how late in the 
session the office fell vacant.”54 
Third, in looking at historical practice, the Court found that the 
broader interpretation of the Clause has been strongly favored.55 
Every President since James Buchanan (1857–61) has made recess 
appointments to vacancies that existed prior to the recess, and many 
of the Presidents prior to Buchanan did likewise.56 Although 
historical data on when vacancies arose is incomplete, “a large 
proportion of the recess appointments in the history of the Nation 
have filled pre-existing vacancies.”57 In addition, the Senate has 
largely not contested the practice, and it has been entirely 
uncontested for approximately seventy-five years.58 
In sum, the ambiguity of the Clause’s text, the Clause’s purpose, 
and the historical application of the Clause led to the conclusion that 
“all vacancies” includes vacancies that become open prior to a 
recess.59 
C. Do Pro Forma Sessions Count as Senate Sessions?
Having interpreted the Recess Appointments Clause, the 
remaining question is: How long was the intra-session recess in 
which President Obama appointed the three NLRB members?60 The 
Solicitor General posited that the recess had been twenty days in 
52. Id. at 2568–69.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 2569–70.
55. Id. at 2570.
56. Id. at 2571.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2573.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2573.
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length—from January 3, when the second session of the 112th 
Congress technically began, to January 23, when the Senate had 
reconvened for regular business.61 The Solicitor General argued that 
the five pro forma sessions held between January 3 and January 23 
should be disregarded because the Senate had been functionally on 
recess the entire time.62 Alternatively, if pro forma sessions count as 
Senate sessions, then the appointments had been made during a 
three-day recess between pro forma sessions.63 
The Court held that pro forma sessions count as sessions 
because during them the Senate maintains the capacity to transact 
business.64 Central to the Court’s determination was that the Senate 
has the right to determine when the Senate is in session.65 Both the 
Constitution’s structure and the Court’s precedents reflected the 
Senate’s ability to set its own rules and control its own schedule.66 
However, the Court looked to the Recess Appointments 
Clause’s purpose in identifying one caveat: the Senate must have the 
ability to conduct business.67 Otherwise it would be meaningless for 
the Senate to say it is in session in name only.68 
By this standard, the Court determined that the pro forma 
sessions were in fact sessions and not a functional recess.69 The 
Court came to this conclusion for several reasons. First, the Senate 
had declared that it was in session.70 Second, the Senate had in fact 
maintained the ability to conduct business.71 For example, just weeks 
before the Presidential appointments of the NLRB members, the 
Senate had passed a bill by unanimous consent during a pro forma 
session.72 Accordingly, the Court refused to engage in the Solicitor 
General’s request for a “more realistic appraisal of what the Senate 
actually did.”73 To hold that the pro forma sessions were actual 
sessions of the Senate and not a form of recess, it was sufficient that 
61. Id. at 2574.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2574–75.
67. Id. at 2575.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2576.
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the Senate had declared itself in session and had maintained the 
capacity to conduct business.74 
In sum, the President had appointed the NLRB members during 
a three-day recess, which is too short of a recess to trigger the Recess 
Appointments Clause.75 The Court, therefore, affirmed the Court of 
Appeals’ judgment but under a completely different rationale.76 
Whereas the Court of Appeals had held that the Clause applies only 
to inter-session recesses and only to vacancies that come open during 
the recess, the Supreme Court held that the Clause applies to both 
inter- and intra-session recesses and to all vacancies regardless of 
when they arise. 
IV. ANALYSIS
Much could be said about the divergent approaches to 
constitutional interpretation exhibited by the majority and concurring 
opinions.77 However, this Comment is focused on the Noel Canning 
opinion’s impact on the hundreds of NLRB decisions made during 
the invalidated members’ tenure, as well as the opinion’s impact on 
future recess appointments. Accordingly, the concurring opinion is 
not discussed because it lacks precedential authority. 
A. Impact of Noel Canning on the NLRB Decisions
Made by the Invalid Board Members 
As a result of Noel Canning, all of the NLRB decisions that 
were decided by the improperly appointed members are invalid and 
must be reheard by the current Board. This covers the 
eighteen-month period from January 4, 2012, when the President 
appointed the three members via the Recess Appointments Clause, to 
July 30, 2013, when the Senate confirmed all five Board members.78 
Early reports suggested 400 to 600 cases needed rehearing.79 
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2574.
76. Id. at 2578.
77. See id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring).
78. Ramsey Cox, Senate Confirms All 5 NLRB Members, THE HILL (July 30, 2013),
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/314503-senate-votes-to-confirm-all-five-nlrb 
-members. To find consensus in the Senate for the confirmation of five NLRB members, the
nominations of the invalidly appointed members were withdrawn, and two of the five members
confirmed were selected by the Republican Party. Id.
79. Benjamin Goad, Workload Threatens to Paralyze Labor Board, THE HILL (July 13,
2014), http://thehill.com/regulation/labor/212031-new-workload-threatens-to-paralyze-obama
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However, NLRB spokesperson Tony Wagner said the Board had 
identified approximately 100 decisions that will be reviewed.80 
Because the five-member NLRB regularly delegates its 
decision-making authority to three-member subsets of the Board, 
only the decisions that had been decided by the invalidated members 
must be reheard.81 Further, many other disputes have subsequently 
been resolved, and the parties will not press for rehearing.82 Dozens 
of NLRB decisions from this time period have been challenged in 
federal court, and these will likely be remanded to the Board for 
reconsideration.83 
The method that the NLRB will use to rehear the decisions is 
unclear. The day Noel Canning was published, the NLRB Chairman 
released a statement that said the NLRB was “analyzing the impact 
that the Court’s decision has on Board cases,” and that the NLRB “is 
committed to resolving any cases affected by today’s decision as 
expeditiously as possible.”84 Although some commentators suggest 
that rehearing the decisions will result in little change,85 many 
-labor-board (stating that more than 400 cases were initially thought to require rehearing);
Richard Meneghello, A Series of Ticking Time Bombs—A Review of the Supreme Court’s 2013–
2014 Term, JDSUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-series
-of-ticking-time-bombs-a-revie-02866/ (stating that more than 600 cases were invalidated and
thought to require rehearing).
80. Goad, supra note 79.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Anne Averitt & Matthew C. Lonergan, Supreme Court Opinion Calls Into Question
Hundreds of NLRB Rulings, JDSUPRA BUS. ADVISOR (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.jdsupra.com 
/legalnews/supreme-court-opinion-calls-into-questio-27774/; see, e.g., Nestle Dreyer’s Ice Cream 
Co. v. NLRB, No. 12-1684 (4th Cir. July 29, 2014) (“The court vacates the Board’s order and 
remands the case to the Board for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s decision 
in NLRB v. Noel Canning . . . .”), available at http://www.chamberlitigation.com/nestle-dreyers 
-ice-cream-company-v-nlrb-et-al (select PDF link for Order Vacating and Remanding to NLRB—
Nestle Dreyer’s Ice Cream Company v. NLRB, et al.).
84. Office of Pub. Affairs, Statement of NLRB Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce on the
Supreme Court’s Noel Canning Decision, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD (June 26, 2014), 
http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/statement-nlrb-chairman-mark-gaston-pearce 
-supreme-courts-noel-canning; see also Office of Pub. Affairs, NLRB Officials Ratify Agency
Actions Taken During Period When Supreme Court Held Board Members Were Not Validly
Appointed, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news
-story/nlrb-officials-ratify-agency-actions-taken-during-period-when-supreme-court (stating that
the NLRB “ratified all administrative, personnel, and procurement matters taken by the Board”
during the invalidated period).
85. Henry W. Sledz, Jr., Supreme Court Affirms Noel Canning Decision, Invalidates
President Obama’s January 2012 Recess Appointments to the NLRB, NAT’L L. REV. (July 4, 
2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-affirms-noel-canning-decision 
-invalidates-president-obama-s-january-20 (“Given the Democratic majority on the Board, we
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commentators contend that rehearing will be more favorable for 
employers than workers.86 
There are at least three reasons for a potential employer-friendly 
outcome as a result of Noel Canning. First, the NLRB decisions 
during the eighteen-month invalidated time period were generally 
worker-friendly.87 Therefore, it is possible that on rehearing 
employers may be more pleased with the outcome. For example, the 
noteworthy NLRB decision, Banner Health System,88 struck down an 
employer’s policy that workers could not discuss “ongoing 
investigations of employee misconduct.”89 The NLRB held that “an 
employer’s interest in maintaining an internal investigation’s 
integrity did not outweigh the potential restrictions the policy 
imposed on an employee’s right to concerted action.”90 This ruling, 
were it to stand, impacts all private-sector employers, not just union 
employers.91 Employers will be eager to see if Banner Health 
System, and other notable decisions, will have more favorable 
outcomes for their interests. The Board’s changed composition could 
lead to a different result the second time around. 
Second, reviewing approximately 100 decisions will likely 
hamper the NLRB for several months.92 This is thought to be 
employer-friendly due to the current worker-friendly nature of the 
Board. Several potentially precedent-setting cases are presently 
before the Board, including the following: “the Northwestern 
University football team’s unionization bid, the right of employees to 
use work email to organize a union, the board’s proposed rule 
anticipate that many of the invalid prior decisions will be reaffirmed by the Board . . . .”); Goad, 
supra note 79 (“Given the board’s political and ideological makeup, the decisions are not likely to 
change much a second time around.”). 
86. See Meneghello, supra note 79; Tanja L. Thompson & Brenda N. Canale, Supreme
Court Holds NLRB Recess Appointments Invalid, HR PROF. MAG., 
http://hrprofessionalsmagazine.com/supreme-court-holds-nlrb-recess-appointments-invalid/ (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
87. What Should Workers and Employers Expect Next from the National Labor Relations
Board?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Health, Emp’t, Labor, and Pensions, 113th Cong. 
8 (2014) (statement of G. Roger King, Of Counsel, Jones Day), available at 
http://edworkforce.house.gov/uploadedfiles/king_testimony_revised.pdf (arguing that the 
invalidated Board was extremely worker-friendly and that the Board “is engaged in an agenda 
that clearly goes considerably beyond moderate policy oscillation”). 
88. 358 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (July 30, 2012).
89. Id. at *2.
90. Averitt & Lonergan, supra note 83.
91. Id.
92. Goad, supra note 79.
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allowing for speedier union elections and a decision that could 
change the very definition of who counts as an employer for the 
purpose of labor rules.”93 If, as some have posited, the current Board 
members have a pro-worker agenda, then they will have a difficult 
time carrying that out in cases that have yet to be decided because of 
the burden of rehearing around 100 cases.94 
Third, an additional change in the Board’s makeup occurred in 
December 2014. Nancy Schiffer, one of the three Democratic 
members on the Board, had her term expire on December 16, 2014, 
and Lauren McFerran was appointed shortly thereafter. Largely 
regarded as a pro-worker addition to the Board, her presence could 
lead to many of the invalidated pro-worker decisions ultimately 
being upheld. However, this remains to be seen. Either way, it is 
possible that things could move in an employer-friendly direction 
when the cases are reheard. 
In sum, the potential for new decisions regarding notable cases, 
the backlog created by rehearing approximately 100 cases, and the 
recent shakeup of the Board make Noel Canning a welcome opinion 
among the employer-friendly crowd. 
B. Impact of Noel Canning on Future Recess Appointments
Noel Canning’s impact on future recess appointments cuts two
ways. On the one hand, the Court’s broad interpretation of “recess” 
and “vacancies that may happen” means that recess appointments are 
constitutional at all times, so long as the recess is of sufficient length. 
On the other hand, weighing against future recess appointments, the 
Court’s determination that pro forma sessions count as Senate 
sessions means that the Senate can use this tactic to block future 
recess appointments. Given the newly established interpretation of 
the Recess Appointments Clause, the following analysis provides an 
overview of how Presidential appointments can and cannot occur 
moving forward. 
The need for and likelihood of recess appointments depends on 
which party controls the two Houses of Congress. First, if the 
members of the President’s own political party control the Senate, 
then recess appointments will likely not be an issue because of recent 
93. Id.
94. See Meneghello, supra note 79.
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changes to Senate rules.95 Until recently, the Senate required a 
supermajority of sixty Senators to support a Presidential nomination 
in order to avoid a filibuster by the opposing party.96 However, in 
November 2013, in a 52-to-48 vote, the Democrat-controlled Senate 
voted to do away with filibusters for all Presidential nominations, 
with the exception of Supreme Court nominations.97 Now, a simple 
majority is all that is needed to ensure confirmation of a President’s 
nominee.98 This rule change upended nearly forty years of requiring 
a supermajority for nominations.99 Consequently, the President will 
have little to no reason to resort to using recess appointments if his or 
her party controls the Senate. 
Second, if the President’s political party controls the House, but 
not the Senate, that party will have the option of demanding 
adjournment on a certain date and creating a recess. The Constitution 
makes it clear that the two Houses of Congress must be in agreement 
when they adjourn for more than three days.100 If the Senate were to 
oppose, then the President has the Constitutional authority to set the 
adjournment date of both Houses of Congress.101 The Constitution 
states, “in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the 
Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall 
think proper.”102 As the Court in Noel Canning stated, this allows the 
President to essentially “force a recess.”103 Practically, this means 
that if members of the President’s political party control the House 
but not the Senate, then that party can use the rules outlined in the 
Constitution to create a recess of sufficient length for the Recess 
Appointments Clause to apply. 
Third, if the President’s political party does not control either 
House of Congress, then the President will be unlikely to appoint 
95. See Peter Shane, Two Cheers for Recess Appointments, PENN PROGRAM ON REG.
REGBLOG (June 26, 2014), http://www.regblog.org/2014/06/26-shane-two-cheers-recess 
-appointments.html.
96. Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on
Nominees, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised 
-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/2013/11/21
/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4.
101. Id. art. II, § 3.
102. Id.
103. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2577 (2014).
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government officials unless they are amenable to the opposing party. 
In this scenario, the President would have no guaranteed method of 
having nominations confirmed or of creating recesses of sufficient 
length for the Recess Appointments Clause to apply.104 For example, 
President Clinton, a Democrat, began his presidency with Democrats 
in control of both Houses of Congress.105 However, Republicans 
took control of both Houses at the first mid-term election and 
remained in control for the remaining six years of Clinton’s 
presidency.106 If this scenario occurred again, because the Senate 
would be free to set its own schedule, the Senate would have the 
option of scheduling business sessions or pro forma sessions to the 
extent needed to negate the President’s ability to appoint officials 
under the Clause.107 Accordingly, the President would have to resort 
to bipartisan cooperation to attain his or her nominees’ 
confirmations.108 
Because the Supreme Court gave great weight to historical 
practice, the tools available to the President for nominations of 
officers are largely the same as they were before Noel Canning. As a 
result of Noel Canning, however, all parties involved know what the 
rules are and what the extent of the President’s authority is under the 
Recess Appointments Clause. 
104. Shane, supra note 95.
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[hereinafter Senate Party Division] (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
106. House Party Divisions, supra note 105; Senate Party Division, supra note 105.
107. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2577.
108. The Vacancies Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349 (2012), provides the rules for the President’s
ability to designate acting officers for certain periods of time. See The Vacancies Act, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE ARCHIVE, http://www.justice.gov/archive/transition/vacancies-act.htm (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2014). 
